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1. INTRODUCTION 
European monetary integration will undoubtedly have a strong effect on the 
present and future macroeconomic policies of the Eastern European countries that are 
candidates for EU accession (namely Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), the so-called Accession 
Countries (ACs). In particular the question which exchange rate regime the ACs 
should choose vis-à-vis the European Monetary Union (EMU) warrants attention. In 
this work, we will focus on the effects of two extreme types of exchange rate regimes: 
fixed and flexible exchange rates1. The underlying assumption is that the choice of the 
exchange rate regime is of considerable short run importance for further integration 
deepening of the ACs with the EU-15. 
To study the effects of alternative economic policy regimes and of interaction 
with the Euroarea on the macroeconomic adjustment of individual transition 
economies, we use relationships derived from a traditional “Mundell-Fleming” (MF) 
model2 (so called from the combination of works done independently by Marcus 
Fleming and Robert Mundell during the early 1960’s: see Fleming 1962 and Mundell 
1962), expanded with an expectations formation mechanism (see Dornbusch 1976). 
This type of models has been criticised for lacking clear micro-foundations: there are 
no agents in the set-up and therefore no one is either openly minimising a loss 
function or maximising a welfare function as a guide to its actions, which, among 
other things, makes welfare evaluations based on the model’s results somewhat 
difficult. Nevertheless, the expanded “MF” still remains very much the “work horse” 
of most macroeconomic modelling with policy aims, due to its elegance, simplicity 
and intuitive policy implications (see Obstfeld 2000 and Rogoff 2001). It has also 
been chosen here because of its small size and low data requirements, which enables 
individual estimations for all the countries in our sample. Furthermore, its tractability 
and flexibility and the existence of an established body of literature on its applications 
has influenced our choice. 
2. MODELLING THE EXCHANGE RATE REGIME 
The model studied here consists of two versions of the standard MF-
framework, one for each exchange rate regime3. The two standard MF model 
conclusions apply4: 
                                                 
1The current accession linkage strategies collapse to, in essence, either a peg or a float: the remaining 
exception to this, Hungary, became a floater within a band in mid 2001 (for works that model this 
strategy, see Golinelli and Rovelli (2000), and Wollmershäuser and Bofinger (2001)). 
2On applications of the MF model and variants of it, see Wdowinski and van Aarle (1998), Plasmans 
(1999), and Roberts and Tyers (2001). For extensions of Dornbusch-type models with policy rules à la 
Taylor, see Svensson (1997a), Leitemo and Røisland (2000) and Bergvall (2000). 
3See Visser and Smits, (1995), Wdowinski and van Aarle, (1998), ibid., and Bank of England (1999) 
for the models on which this one is based. 
4They are derived under the assumption of capital mobility: this implies that, for these outcomes to be 
observed, the coefficient(s) α11 should be “large”. For actual capital mobility indicators for the ACs, in 
an index from 0 to 100, where 100 indicates full liberalization (see IMF (2000)), Estonia and Latvia 
score 97.6, Lithuania 85.7, the Czech Republic, 73.7, Hungary 59.5 while a “larger” economy like 
Poland scores 55.3, Slovenia, 40.5, Bulgaria 35.3, Slovakia, 23.7 and Romania, the less liberalized in 
the group, a mere 12.5 the average, non-GDP weighted, is 58.1. It must be noted that the index above 
was computed using 1997 data –around the middle of our sample- and that now it is certainly higher, 
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i) in a fully flexible exchange rate system, the money supply is 
exogenous and can, in principle, enable an activist policy by the 
monetary authorities, while fiscal policy is not effective; 
ii) in a fixed exchange rate system, the money supply is endogenous. 
Therefore, monetary policy is not effective, while fiscal policy is. 
Following the MF set-up, we assume two regions, a small domestic country and a 
large foreign economy, the Euroarea. Given our focus on the ACs, this “small 
country” assumption is adequate (the joint GDP of all ACs is around 5 per cent of the 
EU’s GDP, or a little more than 7 per cent of the Euroarea GDP), i.e., they are price 
takers on international goods and factor markets (i*, the world real interest rate is 
exogenously given, as is p*, the world price level; and they face a horizontal demand 
curve), so that the effects of the ACs on the large Euroarea economy are negligible. 
The estimated log-linear model will assume the specification below. All series –
except the interest rates- are in natural logarithms, and in deviations from the long-run 
trend (estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter (HP) upon the original series using a 
quarterly penalty parameter λ equal to 1.600). Additionally, due to a question of scale, 
the national net current account and net financial account were converted from USD 
into the national currencies using the average nominal quarterly exchange rate. The 
resulting figures were then divided by real GDP, generating series in terms of output 
share upon which the HP filtering process was used5. 
In equation (1), we have the IS schedule for the real goods market, defined as real 
domestic income in the transition economy (nominal GDP deflated by the CPI index), 
which is assumed to be a function of lagged domestic real GDP, the real interest rate 
(defined as the nominal interest rate in time t –the annualised lending interest rate 
series are set to quarterly rates before that- minus the realised CPI inflation rate in 
time t), the level of real government consumption (the nominal series deflated by the 
CPI index), a competitiveness parameter defined as the real exchange rate, the 
external balance (defined as the net current account) and an external demand shock 
(the real GDP of the Euroarea, the most important trade partner of all the ACs). 
(1) Y  µαααααα +++++−= −−
*
16543211 itititititit
it ybcgry
As indicated above, the competitiveness parameter c is defined as the real 
effective exchange rate (REER), or the difference of the log nominal exchange rate s 
and the domestic price level from the external one, p and p*, respectively, given by 
(2)  *
*
itititit
ppsC +−≡
The REER series above, for a peg regime, will be estimated with the nominal 
exchange rate set at t=0, i.e., its level at the beginning of the sample, or E( )=0. 
.
s
In equation (3), we have the LM schedule, where current money stock is a 
function of the real GDP level, the opportunity cost of holding money (the nominal 
                                                                                                                                            
especially among the relative laggards like Bulgaria, Slovenia and Slovakia (but with the possible 
exception of Romania), given that capital account liberalization is a (pre)-requisite for EU membership. 
5Another specification, using net current and financial accounts in log levels was tested and discarded. 
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interest rate) and the inflation level, and, in the case of the fixed regime, the change in 
international reserves held at the monetary authority (the sum of the reserves in hard 
currencies and gold at national valuation, converted to domestic currency using the 
nominal exchange rate, and in logs). 
(3)  µαααα +++−=
−−− ititititit
repiyM 10191817
In (4), we have the BP schedule, where, in a fixed exchange rate regime, the net 
external balance is defined as, again, the sum of the net current and financial accounts, 
is given by the difference of the nominal domestic and external interest rate (net 
capital flows are, therefore, assumed to be determined by the differential returns), a 
competitiveness parameter c (the REER series for a fixed exchange rate regime is 
calculated in the same way as described above), lagged domestic activity and lagged 
external activity. 
(4)  µαααα ++++

 −=
−−−−
*
11411312
*
1111 ititititit
it yyciiB
As the free floating is assumed to keep the balance of payments in equilibrium 
(B=0), the equation above, in a floating exchange rate regime becomes (5) below 
(5)  µαααα +−++

 −=
−−−−
*
11411312
*
1111
)(
ititititit
yyciisE &
We assume rational exchange rate expectations, which, in the absence of 
uncertainty, implies perfect foresight and therefore, 
 (6) ssE && =)(  
Of course, this not a realistic assumption even for mature market economies, and 
is much less for the ACs in our sample that are introducing market institutions and 
new currencies, while being subject, at the same time, to both country specific and 
common shocks. Nevertheless, given that we do not have adequate proxy series for 
the exchange rate expectations (as expectations are not directly observable), we use 
the series of the realisations of the nominal exchange rate in time t. 
In (7), we have a Phillips Curve Equation, linking inflation with past and future 
prices (this may be understood as representing an economy with overlapping wage 
contracts, some set with backward looking expectations concerning prices and some 
forward looking: see Bank of England 1999, ibid.) and with lagged GDP. 
(7)  µααα +++=
−+− 117116115 itititit
yppP
A straightforward way to evaluate the comparative optimality of the two possible 
regimes in our estimations can be derived from a simple loss function, that enables a 
“policy maker” to compare the welfare derived from the alternative regimes. The loss 
function is defined as (8) below 
(8) U  ( ) ( )


 −= ∑∑
==
n
t
t
n
t
t PY
1211
ββ
where is Y the GDP series generated by Equation (1) and P is the dependent variable 
of equation (7), the Phillips Curve relationship, the “inflation bias” of each regime. 
The βs are the weights assigned by the policy-maker to growth and inflation. 
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With such a model, we will also test the different effects of domestic and external 
“shocks” to key variables of the ACs’ economies. For the external shock, an 
additional equation will be estimated, given by (9) below 
(9) Y  µα +−= −
*
118
*
tt
i
which gives the effects in external demand from an increase in Euroarea interest rate. 
3. DATA AND PROCEDURES 
Quarterly data series taken from the IMF/IFS database were used for all 10 
Central and Eastern European countries in our sample. Quarterly GDP was proxied by 
Industrial Production for Romania in the following manner: yearly GDP figures were 
divided in quarters and regressed on the available quarterly industrial production 
series. Again for Romania, government consumption was proxied by total government 
expenditures multiplied by the average share of the yearly government consumption 
in total government expenditures. A similar procedure was used for the missing parts 
of Polish and Hungarian government consumption series. M1 was used for money. 
The nominal exchange rate series are the nominal national rates to the Euro. The 
REER series were also taken from the IMF, with the exception of Estonia and 
Lithuania, which were kindly provided by the domestic central banks, and for Latvia, 
which was calculated using the nominal exchange rate and CPI price index series, 
minus the Euroarea CPI index series constructed as indicated below. The sample 
period goes from 1993:3 until 2001:4, not only to avoid the know problems associated 
with the earlier years of transition, but to assure a sample period in which all 
necessary data would be available for all countries, including the newly independent 
ones. This does not mean that all the countries here have the data for the full sample 
above: some of them only have data for a considerable shorter sample). For the 
Euroarea, the data was taken from the IMF/IFS series for the period 1993-1997 and 
from the ECB for 1998 onwards. For the 1993-1997 period, Euroarea GDP was built 
by aggregating the national quarterly GDP of the Euroarea member states (excluding 
Belgium, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg, who do not produce quarterly GDP series: 
this implies an average loss of, roughly speaking, 5.25 per cent of the Euroarea GDP). 
GDP-weighted average lending rates were built. For the same period, the CPI 
inflation rates were used for the construction of the -also GDP-weighted- Euroarea 
inflation (the later part of the sample uses the HIPC series produced by Eurostat). 
Before any estimation, the stationarity of the time series was analysed with 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (without intercept and trend, with intercept, with 
intercept and trend, for 1 lag) for both level and first differenced data. Partial 
autocorrelation graphs and the original series’ plots were also used as an aid to the 
diagnosis process. The residuals of the log HP filtered original series are level 
stationary (with the exception of 4 series, which are stationary after one 
differentiation)6. 
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The main initial estimation procedure to be used will be as follows: firstly, the 
two simultaneous equations systems above will be estimated by a heteroskedasticity-
consistent OLS procedure. Afterwards, the estimated series by this procedure will be 
used for the estimation of comparative welfare and the VAR simulation of shocks.  
                                                 
6Tables with all the estimated ADF statistics are available upon request. 
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4.1 Estimated coefficients for both versions of the model 
The main estimated coefficients and their standard errors (indicated as S.E), plus 
their significance levels (* for 1 per cent, ** for 5 per cent and *** for 10 per cent) for 
the float and peg specifications are given below, in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. The 
name of the country is indicated in the first row, the second shows the time sample 
used in the regression, the third the number of observations per equation, and the 
fourth the total number of observations in the system.  
As we may see, the coefficients do not have the same values for individual 
countries in different regimes, but they fall within the intervals defined by their 
respective standard errors and they tend to have the same signs. Concentrating on the 
BP schedule, there are some indications that the significance of the coefficients for 
each specification seems to be related to the actual exchange rate regime followed by 
the country in question: when the country passed through a period of actual greater 
exchange rate flexibility, at least one coefficient was significant. This seems to be 
confirmed by the estimations of coefficients from  regime-specific samples for 
countries with clearly defined peg and float periods (as some of the samples here are 
rather short –one with only 9 observations- those results must be taken with care) 
showed in Table-3 below. Nevertheless, there are no systematic indications of this for 
actual pegs, as only Estonia had any significant variables on its peg BP equation 
among the three “classical” CBA (Currency Board Arrangement) Baltic countries7. 
 
                                                 
7A possible explanation for this may be that, given that the Lithuanian Currency Board Arrangement 
was linked to the USD during the whole sample used and the Latvian hard peg is linked to the SDR, 
they effectively behaved as floating currencies towards the Euro during the period in question, the 
Estonian Kroon fluctuated ±2.16 per cent towards the Euro, while the Litas varied by ±8.86 per cent 
and the Lats by ±13.37 per cent. Those two last values are greater than the ones showed by the Czech 
and Slovak Korunas during their float periods (namely, ±5.49 per cent and ±3.36 per cent respectively), 
or the Polish Zloty (±6.60 per cent), and closer to the variability showed by the Slovenian Tolar 
(±14.02 per cent). The only currencies clearly above them in terms of nominal variability are the 
Bulgarian Lev, during its float period (±93.04 per cent) and the Romanian Leu (±83.66 per cent). 
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Table 1: Estimated Coefficients for the Float Specification 
   BUFLOAT  CZFLOAT  ESFLOAT  HUFLOAT  LAFLOAT  LIFLOAT  PLFLOAT  ROFLOAT  SAFLOAT  SEFLOAT 
  94:2 00:2 93:3 00:4 93:3 01:1 96:2 01:2 94:1 01:2 93:3 00:4 95:2 00:1 95:4 00:4 93:3 00:4 93:3 00:4 
  obs: 25 obs: 30 obs: 31 obs: 21 obs: 30 obs: 30 obs: 20 obs: 21 obs: 30 obs: 30 
  sys  obs. 125 sys  obs. 150 sys  obs. 155 sys  obs. 105 sys  obs. 150 sys  obs. 150 sys  obs. 100 sys  obs. 105 sys  obs. 150 sys  obs. 150 
IS α1 0.125 0.391** -0.118 0.335 0.482*** 0.012 0.403** 1.152*** 0.324* 0.535** 
 S.E. 0.185 0.220 0.237 0.209 0.140 0.221 0.174 0.049 0.199 0.240 
 α2 -0.040*** 0.045 -0.004 -0.009 0.014 0.016 0.003 0.006 -0.002 -0.009* 
 S.E. 0.007 0.065 0.023 0.053 0.009 0.015 0.033 0.020 0.021 0.005 
 α3 -0.201 -0.087 -0.211 -0.486 -0.460*** -0.143 0.654 -0.453 -0.280** -0.264 
 S.E. 0.149 0.088 0.151 0.476 0.076 0.129 0.428 0.372 0.114 0.067 
 α4 -1.839*** 0.180 -0.152 -0.546 -0.078 -0.098 -0.686* -0.055 -0.190 -0.201 
 S.E. 0.476 0.378 0.181 0.450 0.184 0.313 0.381 0.591 0.214 0.242 
 α5 1.330*** 0.000 0.198 0.001* -0.169** 0.175 -0.060 0.001 -0.115 0.195 
 S.E. 0.377 0.000 0.210 0.000 0.084 0.222 0.746 0.002 0.166 0.132 
 α6 0.092** 0.030 -0.032 0.000 0.001 -0.041 -0.036 -0.131 -0.035** 0.001 
 S.E. 0.045 0.026 0.021 0.018 0.012 0.031 0.027 0.106 0.018 0.008 
LM α7 0.524*** 0.861*** 0.081 -0.015 0.251 0.322** 0.167 -0.018 0.793*** -1.411*** 
 S.E. 0.130 0.270 0.169 0.187 0.201 0.140 0.127 0.026 0.281 0.427 
 α8 -0.010** -0.229*** -0.059*** -0.070** -0.036** -0.012 -0.097*** -0.015 -0.089*** -0.032*** 
 S.E. 0.004 0.081 0.020 0.032 0.016 0.012 0.025 0.010 0.020 0.010 
 α9 0.882*** 0.483 0.040 0.009 -0.447 0.360 1.486*** 0.296 1.050* -0.738 
 S.E. 0.037 1.173 0.187 0.372 0.420 0.235 0.399 0.206 0.591 0.546 
 α10 0.392*** 0.055 0.049 0.266*** 0.186 0.173* 0.350** 0.239 -0.176*** -0.198** 
 S.E. 0.072 0.154 0.108 0.099 0.143 0.102 0.167 0.170 0.060 0.088 
BP α11 0.017*** 0.000 -0.005 0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.000 -0.010 -0.002 -0.002 
(S) S.E. 0.005 0.026 0.003 0.013 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.007 0.007 0.002 
 α12 2.210*** 0.365** 0.027 0.300*** 0.580 -0.145 0.333* 0.482** 0.413** 0.380*** 
 S.E. 0.356 0.165 0.049 0.103 0.948 0.178 0.174 0.212 0.110 0.090 
 α13 0.545*** 0.050 0.009 -0.009 0.105 0.165** -0.059 -0.003 0.044 0.096 
 S.E. 0.196 0.079 0.026 0.052 0.069 0.083 0.064 0.021 0.090 0.086 
 α14 -0.152*** -0.011 -0.003 -0.013*** 0.000 -0.005 -0.013 -0.052 -0.003 0.000 
 S.E. 0.052 0.009 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.012 0.010 0.042 0.006 0.004 
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Table 2: Estimated Coefficients for the Peg Specification 
 BUPEG          CZPEG ESPEG HUPEG LAPEG LIPEG PLPEG ROPEG SAPEG SEPEG
94:2 00:2 93:3 00:4 93:3 01:2 96:2 01:2 94:1 01:2 93:3 01:1 95:2 00:1 95:4 00:4 93:3 00:4 93:3 00:4 
obs: 25 obs: 30 obs: 32 obs: 21 obs: 30 obs: 31 obs: 20 obs: 21 obs: 30 obs: 30 
sys  obs 125 sys  obs 150 sys  obs 160 sys  obs 105 sys  obs 150 sys  obs 155 sys  obs 100 sys  obs 105 sys  obs 150 sys  obs 150 
IS α1 -0.097 0.422** -0.052 -0.270 0.418*** 0.015 0.181 1.157*** 0.198 -0.096 
 S.E. 0.205 0.218 0.229 0.233 0.138 0.213 0.211 0.049 0.184 0.212 
 α2 -0.012*** 0.076 -0.005 0.000 0.002 -0.005 -0.013 0.013 -0.010 0.002 
 S.E. 0.004 0.071 0.023 0.039 0.011 0.020 0.029 0.022 0.017 0.005 
 α3 -0.052 -0.083 -0.286** -0.113 -0.441*** -0.135 0.465 -0.436 -0.247** -0.158*** 
 S.E. 0.155 0.088 0.139 0.356 0.073 0.124 0.423 0.367 0.099 0.053 
 α4 -0.136*** -0.216 -0.094 -1.018*** -0.210* -0.254 -0.715** -0.172 -0.549** -0.490*** 
 S.E. 0.040 0.365 0.102 0.266 0.126 0.176 0.307 0.286 0.212 0.103 
 α5 1.116*** 0.000 0.103 0.000* -0.127 0.067 -0.009 0.001 -0.027 0.097 
 S.E. 0.379 0.000 0.205 0.000 0.084 0.221 0.701 0.002 0.146 0.097 
 α6 -0.057 0.031 -0.023 -0.046** -0.001 -0.044 -0.057** -0.181 -0.020 0.004 
 S.E. 0.071 0.025 0.018 0.018 0.011 0.030 0.028 0.124 0.015 0.005 
LM α7 0.524*** 0.861*** 0.067 -0.015 0.251 0.328** 0.167 -0.018 0.793*** -1.411*** 
 S.E. 0.130 0.270 0.162 0.187 0.201 0.143 0.127 0.026 0.281 0.427 
 α8 -0.010** -0.229*** -0.059*** -0.070** -0.036** -0.012 -0.097*** -0.015* -0.089*** -0.032*** 
 S.E. 0.004 0.081 0.020 0.032 0.016 0.013 0.025 0.010 0.020 0.010 
 α9 0.882*** 0.483 0.031 0.009 -0.447 0.384* 1.486*** 0.296 1.050* -0.738 
 S.E. 0.037 1.173 0.183 0.372 0.420 0.239 0.399 0.206 0.591 0.546 
 α10 0.392*** 0.055 0.045 0.266*** 0.186 0.163* 0.350** 0.239 -0.176*** -0.198** 
 S.E. 0.072 0.154 0.106 0.099 0.143 0.104 0.167 0.170 0.060 0.088 
BP α11 0.004 70.615 -0.046* -43.784 -0.004 0.009 0.022 4.225 0.066** 0.006 
(B) S.E. 0.007 107.889 0.026 68.923 0.021 0.018 0.014 5.431 0.027 0.017 
 α12 0.023 683.153 -0.266** 71.617 -0.154 -0.077 0.030 29.882 0.668 0.126 
 S.E. 0.062 644.008 0.133 458.709 0.252 0.191 0.150 85.736 0.480 0.437 
 α13 -0.139 -203.307 0.011 417.440 -0.207 -0.062 -0.216** 3.528 0.396 -0.465 
 S.E. 0.248 271.151 0.233 344.457 0.248 0.204 0.104 14.851 0.380 0.629 
 α14 0.005 97.799*** -0.011 16.319 0.027 0.004 0.005 5.168 0.059* 0.004 
 S.E. 0.110 31.083 0.022 36.658 0.023 0.030 0.014 37.670 0.032 0.025 
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Table 3: Coefficients for Regime-Specific Samples 
  BUFLOAT CZFLOAT SAFLOAT BUPEG CZPEG SAPEG 
  94:2 97:1 97:4 00:4 98:4 00:4 97:2 00:2 93:3 97:1 93:3 98:3 
  obs: 12 obs: 13 obs: 9 obs: 13 obs: 15 obs: 21 
  sys  obs. 60 sys  obs. 65 sys  obs. 45 sys  obs 65 sys  obs 75 sys  obs 105 
IS α1 1.105* 0.257 0.088 -0.452** 0.266 0.154 
 S.E. 0.599 0.374 0.254 0.205 0.342 0.298 
 α2 -0.059*** 0.094 -0.031 -0.055*** -0.076 -0.012 
 S.E. 0.017 0.149 0.035 0.012 0.138 0.029 
 α3 -0.999 0.006 -0.272** -0.158 -0.266* -0.182 
 S.E. 0.635 0.120 0.130 0.105 0.152 0.190 
 α4 -2.639*** -0.060 -0.422 -0.288*** 1.049 -0.595* 
 S.E. 0.940 0.827 0.379 0.068 0.724 0.331 
 α5 0.582 0.001 -0.350 2.470*** 0.000 0.052 
 S.E. 0.638 0.001 0.408 0.562 0.000 0.235 
 α6 0.063 0.067 -0.058 -0.021 0.049 -0.019 
 S.E. 0.105 0.067 0.050 0.100 0.039 0.020 
LM α7 0.320 0.370 -0.193 0.552*** 0.446 1.070*** 
 S.E. 0.275 0.382 0.633 0.120 0.357 0.349 
 α8 -0.002 -0.046 -0.150*** -0.015*** -0.971*** -0.074*** 
 S.E. 0.008 0.102 0.042 0.004 0.242 0.026 
 α9 0.931*** -1.868 -0.997 0.846*** -0.142 1.242* 
 S.E. 0.077 1.461 1.323 0.028 2.542 0.704 
 α10 0.274** 0.076 -0.162 0.585*** -0.235 -0.156** 
 S.E. 0.126 0.254 0.336 0.140 0.187 0.064 
BP α11 0.035*** 0.051 -0.030** 0.007* 314.615 0.106** 
 S.E. 0.008 0.062 0.013 0.004 305.186 0.041 
 α12 1.406*** 0.438 0.942*** -0.041 1578.601 0.918 
 S.E. 0.418 0.331 0.301 0.053 1652.058 0.659 
 α13 0.263 0.061 -0.198 -0.157 -382.432 0.752 
 S.E. 0.264 0.155 0.178 0.141 643.051 0.531 
 α14 -0.239*** 0.017 0.029 -0.110 136.718* 0.058* 
 S.E. 0.078 0.025 0.039 0.090 75.652 0.037 
 
We may observe from Tables 2 and 3 above that the values of the coefficients of the BP 
schedule in the peg for Hungary and the Czech Republic are rather large (even after the GDP 
share correction done to this series). This is explained by the fact that those countries were the 
ones that attracted –by far- the largest inflows of capital among the ones in our sample, by 
their positions as “early reformers”. During some periods in our sample, the positive inflow of 
capital surpassed 30 % of the quarterly Czech GDP; after the collapse of its peg regime in 
1997, the inflows quickly reversed, reaching as low as minus ten per cent of its GDP. The 
Lucas-critique is an important question concerning this work. If we would assume the 
coefficients of the fundamental variables to be conditional on the policy choice, as they are 
derived from the actual data series, it would imply that they would be determined by the 
current exchange rate regime. It would not be possible to derive two sets of series 
characterizing different regimes from the same data generating process. As it turns out, our 
own estimated coefficients are quite similar for all key variables (and all differences fall 
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within the range defined by the standard errors), with the exception of the BP schedule, but 
this is due to the fact that the BP schedule is generated by a different equation for each 
regime. We will, therefore, proceed simply assuming that the “Lucas Critique” argument does 
not apply here, namely, that the coefficients would be structurally stable within the used 
estimation sample, and use the series generated by those estimated coefficients from the full 
samples in the welfare comparisons and shock simulations below. 
4.2 Welfare effects of exchange rate regime choices 
Table 4: The Loss-Function Outcomes 
Country Regime β11.00 β10.75 β10.67 β10.50 β10.33 β10.25 β10.00 
Bulgaria FLOAT 0.208 0.163 0.149 0.119 0.088 0.074 0.030 
 PEG -0.136 -0.113 -0.105 -0.089 -0.072 -0.065 -0.041 
Czech Rep. FLOAT 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 
 PEG -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
Estonia FLOAT 0.054 0.024 0.015 -0.005 -0.025 -0.035 -0.064 
 PEG 0.046 0.020 0.012 -0.006 -0.023 -0.031 -0.057 
Hungary FLOAT 0.257 0.198 0.180 0.140 0.101 0.082 0.024 
 PEG -0.077 -0.055 -0.048 -0.033 -0.018 -0.011 0.011 
Latvia FLOAT -0.111 -0.069 -0.056 -0.027 0.002 0.015 0.057 
 PEG -0.211 -0.145 -0.124 -0.079 -0.035 -0.014 0.052 
Lithuania FLOAT -0.306 -0.230 -0.206 -0.154 -0.102 -0.078 -0.002 
 PEG -0.242 -0.183 -0.164 -0.124 -0.085 -0.066 -0.007 
Poland FLOAT 0.248 0.182 0.161 0.117 0.072 0.051 -0.015 
 PEG -0.413 -0.311 -0.279 -0.209 -0.139 -0.107 -0.005 
Romania FLOAT -83.120 -62.460 -55.849 -41.800 -27.752 -21.140 -0.480 
 PEG -62.515 -46.973 -41.999 -31.430 -20.861 -15.887 -0.345 
Slovakia FLOAT -0.137 -0.100 -0.088 -0.063 -0.037 -0.025 0.012 
 PEG -0.133 -0.097 -0.085 -0.061 -0.036 -0.025 0.012 
Slovenia FLOAT 0.124 0.093 0.084 0.063 0.042 0.032 0.001 
 PEG 0.019 0.014 0.013 0.009 0.006 0.004 -0.001 
 
The country-specific results of the estimated welfare-functions are shown in Table 4 
above. The weights given to output and inflation by the policy-maker were set to vary 
between 1.00-0.00, 0.75-0.25, 0.67-0.33, 0.50-0.50, 0.33-0.67, 0.25-0.75 and 0.00-1.00. The 
regimes that perform better in each combination are indicated in italic. As an exchange rate 
strategy, the float seems to dominate the peg: six out of ten countries are better off with it, and 
even apparently obvious candidates for a harder regime, due to size or stabilisation 
considerations, like Bulgaria or Latvia, would seem to fare better under a more flexible 
regime. The peg only seems to produce superior results in economies still in need of macro 
stabilisation, and therefore of an external nominal anchor with credibility problems for their 
monetary and/or fiscal authorities, or with some shaky fundamentals (Lithuania, Romania and 
Slovakia). More than that, the “optimal” exchange rate strategy is stable to different 
combinations of the parameter weights in the loss function for most countries. Switching –and 
even here in a few cases- to the other regime is only observed in the extreme of the 
distribution (if a zero weight is attributed to growth in the welfare function, while all weight is 
given to inflation stabilisation: the “inflation nutter” scenario). Estonia is the only exception, 
favouring either regime within a credible range of parameters, and being indifferent to regime 
choice in the mid-point of the distribution (equivalent weights of 0.50 for both parameters). 
5. NON-STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION OF THE EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC AND 
FOREIGN SHOCKS 
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The effects of different shocks under each exchange rate arrangement will be simulated 
via a non-structural approach, namely, through a VAR (vector auto-regression) procedure 
upon the arrangement-specific estimated series. In the VAR, three types of shocks are 
simulated for the countries in our sample: 
i) a domestic fiscal shock (a 1 standard deviation unexpected shock to the 
government consumption expenditures); 
ii) a domestic monetary shock (a 1 standard deviation unexpected shock to the 
nominal interest rate)8; 
iii) a external monetary shock (a 1 standard deviation unexpected shock to the 
Euroarea nominal interest rate). 
The extend of the last shock mirrors the degree of integration (and vulnerability) of these 
economies to Euroarea economic events. 
In Table 5 below, we present an overview of the effects of the VAR simulated shocks 
into the two variables that we used to define our welfare function, GDP and CPI inflation. In 
general, as we will see in the next section, a float regime, besides being optimal under normal 
conditions according to our welfare function, also outperforms a harder regime as a “shock 
absorber” for most countries –if all the three types of shocks are weighted equally, namely for 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia (the clear exceptions are 
Lithuania and Poland, while for Latvia and Slovakia both regimes seem to perform similar 
cushioning functions, and for Romania shocks have “explosive” effects under both regimes, 
but less under a float), as most shocks not only have smaller GDP and CPI effects under a 
float, but they also converge faster to the mean (the most consistent exception to this stylised 
picture is the external monetary shock: if one would consider this as the most important type 
of shocks for an economy like, say, Estonia, then the peg would be a better “shock absorber”). 
In the table below we can also observe what we may call “non-Keynesian”9, or non-“MF” 
results, from monetary policies that are effective under a peg to fiscal ones that are effective 
under a float, to expansionary fiscal and monetary contractions. GDP expansions under fiscal 
contraction were estimated for the Bulgaria and Slovenia, and GDP expansions under tighter 
domestic monetary conditions were estimated for the Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (some of those outcomes are regime-
dependent). 
Table 5: Overview of Initial Effects of Shocks per Country and Regime: Temporary 
Shocks (non-structural model) 
Shock  Fiscal  Monetary  External  
Country  GDP CPI GDP CPI GDP CPI 
Bulgaria Peg + - + - - ++ 
 Float - - - + - + 
Czech Rep. Peg - - + + + + 
 Float - + - + + + 
Estonia Peg -- + - - + - 
 Float - + - - + ++ 
Hungary Peg - - - - + ++ 
                                                 
8Both these two domestic shocks can be seen in terms of the effects of a nominal convergence process, i.e., as 
part of an attempt by the country to fulfil the Maastricht criteria. 
9One could explain these “non-Keynesian” outcomes by a situation where a contractionary stance by the Central 
Bank or by the government is seen as an indication of a more sustainable policy by the markets (see Giavazzi 
and Paganno (1990)). 
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 Float - + - - + ++ 
Latvia Peg -- - - - + + 
 Float -- - - - + + 
Lithuania Peg - -- + + - - 
 Float - - + + + + 
Poland Peg 0 0 + - + + 
 Float + - ++ - + + 
Romania Peg -- -- ++ ++ -- -- 
 Float -- -- ++ ++ -- -- 
Slovakia Peg -- - + + - - 
 Float -- - + + - - 
Slovenia Peg + + ++ - + -- 
 Float -- + + + - ++ 
5.1 Structural estimation of the effects of domestic and foreign shocks 
As an additional exercise, a similar set of permanent shocks where modelled using the 
coefficients derived from the structural model. An overview of the results of those simulations 
is presented in Table 6 below. 
Table 6: Overview of Initial Effects of Shocks per Country and Regime: Permanent 
Shocks (structural model). 
Shock  Fiscal  Monetary  External  
Country  GDP CPI GDP CPI GDP CPI 
Bulgaria Peg 0 0 0 0 - + 
 Float -- - - + + - 
Czech Rep. Peg - 0 -- ++ - - 
 Float - 0 - + - - 
Estonia Peg -- ++ -- ++ + - 
 Float - + - + ++ ++ 
Hungary Peg 0 0 - + + - 
 Float - + 0 0 0 0 
Latvia Peg + - 0 0 - + 
 Float + - + - 0 0 
Lithuania Peg - + 0 0 + - 
 Float - + + - + - 
Poland Peg - + - -- - -- 
 Float - ++ 0 + - - 
Romania Peg ++ -- -- ++ ++ -- 
 Float ++ -- -- ++ ++ -- 
Slovakia Peg + - + - + - 
 Float ++ -- 0 0 ++ -- 
Slovenia Peg - - - 0 - ++ 
 Float -- -- + 0 0 + 
 
From the table above, we can observe that, in several instances, the shocks have an 
opposite sign to the outcomes of the temporary, non-structural estimations (in three-quarters 
of them, in the case of the GDP effects of the external shock). Again, classic “Keynesian” 
results are observed only in some of the estimations, from monetary policies that are non (or 
less) effective under a peg (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania) to fiscal ones that are (more) effective 
under a peg (only in Estonia). For Romania, shocks still have “explosive” effects under any 
regime. An analysis of the amplitude and duration of the effects of the shocks shows 
furthermore that a float regime no longer acts as a more effective “shocks absorber” for those 
permanent shocks, which is a natural result, given that adjustment to permanent shocks should 
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involve real adjustment, and all that a nominal framework like the exchange rate can be 
expected to realistically provide is a cushion towards the necessary real adjustment. As a 
general remark, we may also add that the coefficients for the permanent shocks tend to be 
much smaller than the ones estimated for the temporary ones. 
Part of those results –for both temporary and permanent shocks- can be explained by the 
less than perfect degree of capital mobility in the countries in our sample during the period in 
question. It is a common result in “MF” models that, under less than complete capital 
mobility, both types of policy can be partially effective under both regimes, and that is indeed 
the case for most of the ACs. The estimated coefficients that would in principle capture 
capital mobility in our models are, on average, rather low and several are even negative. A 
possible explanation for this could be the adverse reaction of capital inflows –especially the 
short-term ones- observed during the 1997 Asian Crisis and the 1998 Russian one. 
Contractionary fiscal and monetary policies with observed positive growth effects could be a 
sign of a “rational expectations” channel in operation in some of those countries. 
On the other hand, the large standard errors, lack of significance of several coefficients 
and average low explanatory power of the BP schedule equation, do suggest care in 
interpreting those results. Those caveats are possibly caused by some short-run features of the 
“transition” economies present on the limited data series used and captured by the estimated 
coefficients (for instance, the characteristic reduction of inflation parallel to a resumption of 
growth after the end of the “transitional recession”, and the reaction to shocks and even 
episodes of “contagion” during the sample period). 
 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
We aimed in this paper to describe the optimal exchange rate strategy for integration of 
the ACs into the common European currency zone using the MF framework. The results from 
a formal modeling exercise of alternative exchange rate regimes for pre-EMU accession for 
all Eastern European ACs seem to indicate that a float regime would bring about, as a rule, a 
greater degree of aggregate welfare and would also be a better “shock absorber” for 
temporary shocks, if all shocks are weighted equally. Harder regimes would be indicated for 
countries with weaker credibility and macroeconomic foundations. The welfare results seem 
to be robust to changes in the policy-maker’s preferences, as expressed in the weights given to 
the parameters of the welfare function. 
The practical policy implications seems to be that different regimes should be allowed to 
remain until ERM-2 (European Exchange Rate Mechanism) entry, instead of trying to impose 
a single framework. As such a unique framework might be welfare reducing for at least some 
of the countries in question, that would be a rather perverse policy outcome. 
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